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Abstract
We describe a type system for the Xdπ calculus [9]. An Xdπ-network is a network of loca-
tions, where each location consists of both a data tree (which contains scripts and pointers
to nodes in trees at different locations) and a process, for modelling process interaction,
process migration and interaction between processes and data. Our type system is based
on types for locations, data and processes, expressing security levels. A tree can store data
of different security level, independently from the security level of the enclosing location.
The access and mobility rights of a process depend on the security level of the “source” lo-
cation of the process itself, i.e. of the location where the process was in the initial network
or where the process was created by the activation of a script. The type system enjoys type
preservation under reduction (subject reduction). In consequence of subject reduction we
prove the following security properties. In a well-typed Xdπ-network, a process P whose
source location is of level h can copy data of security level at most h and update data of
security level less than h. Moreover, the process P can only communicate data and go to
locations of security level equal or less than h.
1 Introduction
Information systems have evolved into open distributed systems that include decen-
tralised peer-to-peer networks. An essential role of such systems is management of
data, which appear to be semi-structured and distributed. Data-sharing applications
require to integrate mobile processes and semi-structured data.
1 This work was partly funded by the project MMIT 1438 of PSNTR, by FP6-2004-510996
Coordination Action TYPES, by the project GLORA 144029 of MSEP and by the ANR
project “ParSec” ANR-06-SETI-010-02.
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As information networks become more open and dynamic, the need for security
and privacy grows stronger. Systems must be able to exchange data and processes
while preserving security. One solution is to ground them on typed models. In such
models, a well-typed network must reduce only to well-typed networks, assuring
access and movement rights.
In this paper we propose a type system for the Xdπ calculus [9]. An Xdπ-network is
a network of locations, where each location consists of both a data tree and of a run-
ning process, for modelling process interaction, process migration and interaction
between processes and data. The leaves of data trees contain pointers to nodes in
trees of different locations, and scripts, i.e. static processes, which can be activated.
In turn, scripts, pointers and trees can occur inside scripts and running processes.
In addition to the original syntax, we decorate location names with security levels
taken from a partially ordered set of security levels with a bottom element. There-
fore a location in a well-formed network will be of the shape:
lh[ T ‖ P ]
where l is a location name, h is its security level, T is a tree of data and P is
a running process. Pointers, scripts and running processes are assigned security
levels by means of a typing system.
The access and mobility rights of a process depend on the security level of the
“source” location of the process itself, i.e. of the location where the process was in
the initial network or where the process was created by the activation of a script.
Hence in a well typed network each process has the security level of its source
location. Security levels of scripts and pointers in trees, however, don’t depend on
the level of the enclosing location.
Processes migrate thanks to the go command. The go command can only move
a process from one location to a location of security level lower or equal to the
level of the process itself. Processes can also communicate data via channels. The
security levels of the communicated data will never exceed the security level of the
process.
Running processes can activate scripts in the local tree by the command runp,
where p is a path expression which identifies a set of nodes. In a well-typed network
a scripted process can be activated only if its security level is at most the one of the
enclosing location.
Running processes can also modify the local tree and use the information in that
tree by means of the command update. All trees can be copied by all processes,
but only trees containing no data can be deleted and possibly replaced. A process
of security level h can only read data of security level at most h, and modify data
of security level less than h. The only exception being that processes generated
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by activating scripts can modify scripts of the same security level and in the same
positions in trees.
Related Work The Xdπ calculus [9,14] models both localised, mobile processes
and distributed, dynamic, semi-structured data, allowing to represent data-sharing
applications. It can be seen as an extension of the Active XML model [1].
The locations and the processes of Xdπ are essentially those of dπ [10] enriched
with capabilities for data manipulation. The only difference is that a process in dπ
can migrate to a location independently from the existence of the location itself in
the current network, while in Xdπ such an existence is a necessary condition for
migration. The data trees of Xdπ are related to those in [2,4] and the treatment of
shared distributed data is inspired by [19]. We refer to [9] for further references
related to the calculus design.
Many type systems controlling the use of resources and the mobility of processes
have been proposed for the dπ calculus [10] and for related calculi [16,6,5]. The
types discussed here are essentially inspired by the security types checking access
rights for π-calculus of [11]. For simplicity we do not distinguish between reading
and mobility rights, but our type system can be extended to take them into account.
Another simplification is to have elements of a partially ordered set with a bottom
element as security levels instead of elements of a lattice as it is usual [20], this
choice being justified by the fact that we do not use meets and joins. We formalise
the network properties assured by our type system using the notions of network
invariant and initial network as in [3].
The present paper is an expanded and revised version of [8], the main differences
being:
• the data in trees can be of different security levels and do not depend on the secu-
rity level of the enclosing location, while in [8] each location was only allowed
to contain data of at most the security level of the location itself;
• the communication, copying, updating and mobility rights of processes only de-
pend on their source location, while in [8] they were depending on the enclosing
location, but for the possibility of processes to move back to their source loca-
tions;
• the capability of modifying data requires a higher security level than the capabil-
ity of reading data, while in [8] there was no difference;
• there is a special type for data-less trees, i.e. trees whose leaves contain no data,
because only data-less trees can be deleted or replaced (they can be considered
garbage).
Outline of the paper Section 2 and Section 3 introduce the syntax, the reduction
rules, and the typing rules of typed Xdπ, exemplified by the examples in Section 5.
The properties of the calculus are discussed in Section 4 and proved in Appen-
dices B and C. Section 6 contains a few final remarks.
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2 Syntax and Operational Semantics
The Xdπ calculus we consider here is essentially the calculus introduced in [9],
with a few important differences.
The main difference between the original Xdπ and the present one is the use of a
typed syntax. We decorate the location names with security levels and the channel
names with value types. (An alternative approach could avoid these decorations by
fixing an environment for locations and channels.)
More importantly, the syntax includes a typed matching function instead of an un-
typed one. Pattern matching needs to take types into account, in order to have type
preservation under reduction. We will explain and motivate this choice at the end
of the section.
In order to simplify the syntax we only allow monadic instead of polyadic com-
munication and we do not distinguish between public channels (which cannot be
restricted) and session channels (which must be restricted in the scripts). 2 These
features of the original Xdπ can be easily handled by our type system.
2.1 Syntax
Networks A network is a parallel composition ( | ) of locations consisting of a
tree and a process, where processes at different locations can share communication
channels. In a well-formed network the locations have different names. The syntax
of networks is given in Table 1. We use l,m to range over location names, and
h, i, j over security levels. The location lh[ T ‖ P ] is well-formed if both the tree
T and the process P do not contain occurrences of free variables. We use c to range
over channel names and Tv to denote a value type as defined in Table 9. The binder
ν is, as usual, the restriction operator.
Trees The data model is an unordered edge-labelled rooted tree with leaves con-
taining empty trees, scripts and pointers. The syntax of trees is presented in Table 2,
using a to denote an edge label.
A script is a static process embedded in a tree that can be activated by a process
from the same location. We use Π to range over processes and variables, and a
script is denoted by Π.
2 The distinction between public and session channels is important for implementation
since otherwise one needs to alpha-convert the whole data tree of a location when a process,
restricting a channel name, migrates.
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N ::= 0 | N | N | lh[T ‖ P ] | (νcTv)N
Table 1
Syntax of networks
T ::= ∅ empty rooted tree
| x tree variable
| T | T composition of trees, joining the roots
| a[T ] edge labeled a with subtree T
| a[Π] edge labeled a with script Π
| a[p@λ] edge labeled a with pointer p@λ
Table 2
Syntax of trees
p ::= a | // | .. | . | x | p / p
Table 3
Syntax of paths
A path identifies nodes in a tree. Table 3 gives the formation rules of paths, using p
to range over paths. In a path, “a” denotes a step along an edge a, “ // ” denotes any
node, “..” a step back, “.” the path from the root to the current node, x a variable
and “/ ” the path composition. We will say that a path is a local path if it contains
“.”. 3
We use λ to range over variables and location names super-scripted by security
levels. A pointer p@λ refers to the set of nodes identified by the path p in the tree
at location λ.
Processes The processes that we are concerned with are essentially dπ-calculus
processes [10], where the local communication modelled by π-calculus processes
[15], [21] is extended with migration between locations (command go). There are
two more commands for local communication between processes and data: one
3 The path syntax allows also meaningless paths, like “./ ./ .”: this could be clearly
avoided either by typing or by refining the syntax.
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P ::= 0 the nil process
| P | P composition of processes
| (νcTv)P declare new channel name c transmitting values of type Tv
| γ¯〈v〉 output value v on a channel γ
| γ(x).P input parametrised by a variable x
| !γ(x).P replication of an input process
| go λ.P migrate to location λ, continue as P
| go 	 .P migrate to the source location, continue as P
| runp run the processes identified by the path expression p
| updatep(χ, V ).P update command
Table 4
Syntax of processes
v ::= cTv | T | P | lh | p
Table 5
Syntax of values
χ ::= xDL | x | xj | y⋆@xj
V ::= T | P | p@λ
Table 6
Syntax of patterns and data terms
for updating (copy, paste, cut, etc.) the data tree (update) and the other one that
activates the execution of scripts that are embedded in local data tree (run). We use
P,Q,R to range over processes, and γ to range over channel names (decorated by
value types) and variables. The syntax of processes is given in Table 4.
A value is either a channel name super-scripted with a value type, a tree, a script of
a fixed security level, a location name super-scripted with a security level or a path.
Using v to range over values, the syntax of values is given in Table 5.
The argument of go is a location name (super-scripted with a security level) or a
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variable, or the symbol “	”, which can only occur in scripts to denote the location
where the script will be activated.
The two arguments of the update command are respectively a pattern χ and a data
term V , whose syntax is given in Table 6. A pattern is either a data-less tree vari-
able, or a tree variable, or a script pattern, or a pointer pattern. In a pointer pattern
j is a security level and ⋆ ∈ {Local, ǫ} 4 indicates whether y stands for a local path
or for a path without occurrences of “.”. Data terms can be trees, scripts or pointers.
The need to distinguish generic trees from data-less trees (that is trees whose leaves
are empty) arises from the facts that trees themselves do not have security level. In
order for a process to delete or replace a tree, it has to have permission to delete
all the data contained in the tree first. Then any process, regardless of its security
level, can delete or replace a data-less trees.
In updatep(χ, V ).P the variables of χ can occur both in V and in P and they are
bound. For this reason we allow variable occurrences in trees, scripts, pointers and
processes.
2.2 Reduction rules
The reduction relation describes three forms of interactions:
• processes can communicate with each other within a location (rules (com) and
(com!));
• processes can move between locations (rules (stay) and (go));
• process can interact with the local data (rules (update) and (run)).
The reduction relation is the least relation on networks which is closed with respect
to structural congruence, reduction rules given in Table 7 and reduction contexts,
given by
C ::= − | C | N | (νcTv)C.
The standard definition of structural congruence is presented in Appendix A.
The rules, (com) and (com!) are the communication rules from the π-calculus [15,21].
Processes can communicate only if they are in the same location.
There are two rules for migration. Rule (go) describes migration to a distinct loca-
tion. The other rule, (stay), describes staying at the location where you are.
4 Here and in the following we use ǫ to denote the empty string, so we get either yLocal@xj
or y@xj .
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(com) lh[ T || c¯Tv〈v〉 | cTv(z).P | Q ]→ lh[ T || P{v/z} | Q ]
(com!) lh[ T || c¯Tv〈v〉 |!cTv(z).P | Q ]→ lh[ T || !cTv(z).P | P{v/z} | Q ]
(stay) lh[ T || go lh.P | Q ]→ lh[ T || P | Q ]
(go) lh[ T1 || go mj .P | Q ] | mj[ T2 || R ]→ lh[ T1 || Q ] | mj[ T2 || P | R ]
(run)
p(T ) p,lh,xh,x T, {{P1/x}, . . . , {Pn/x}}
lh[ T || runp | Q ]→ l
h[ T || P1 | . . . | Pn | Q ]
(update)
p(T ) p,lh,χ,V T
′, {s1, . . . ,sn}
lh[ T ‖ updatep(χ, V ).P | Q ]→ l
h[ T ′ ‖ Ps1 | . . . | Psn | Q ]
Table 7
Reduction rules
(Empty tree) ∅ θ ∅, ∅
(Script) P  θ P, ∅
(Pointer) p@lh  θ p@lh, ∅
(Node)
T  θ T
′,Θ
a[T ] θ a[T
′],Θ
(Par)
T  θ T
′,Θ1 S  θ S
′,Θ2
T |S  θ T
′|S′,Θ1 ∪Θ2
(Up)
match(U,χ) = s V s θ V
′,Θ θ = p, lh, χ, V
a[U ] θ a[V
′], {s{lh/ 	, p/.}} ∪Θ
Table 8
Definition of the update function 
The command runp finds all the scripts in the local tree identified by the path p
and activates their parallel execution, after replacing “	” and “.” by the enclosing
location and the path p, respectively.
The update command updatep(χ, V ).P traversing top-down the local tree finds all
the data terms Vk given by the path p and pattern matches these data terms with χ
to obtain substitutions sk when they exist. For each successful pattern matching it
replaces the Vk with V sk and starts Psk in parallel. The match function, in order
to check if a data term agrees with a pattern, requires not only the data term to
be, respectively, a data-less tree, a tree, a pointer or a script, according to the four
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shapes of the pattern (as in [9]), but it requires also the data terms to satisfy the type
information given by the pattern. This means that:
(1) if the pattern is xDL, then the data term must be a data-less tree,
(2) if the pattern is x, then the data term must be a tree,
(3) if the pattern is y⋆@xj, then the data term must be a pointer in which (i) the path
can be a local path only if ⋆ = Local and (ii) the location must be of level j,
(4) if the pattern is xj , then the data term must be a script of level j.
These conditions are enforced by using the type assignment system of next section.
If the typed match is successful, the function returns a substitution which replaces
the variables in the pattern by the corresponding data terms. More precisely the
definition of the match function is:
(1) match(T, xDL) = {T/x} if ⊢ T : DLTree;
(2) match(T, x) = {T/x} if ⊢ T : Tree;
(3) match(p@lj, y⋆@xj) = {lj/x, p/y} if ⊢ p : Path⋆;
(4) match(P,xj) = {P/x} if ⊢ P : ProcLocal(j).
In principle it would be desirable to avoid security level matching at run time,
and rely on static typing only. However in this setting, static typing would be too
restrictive. Values in a tree can have any security level, and we cannot statically
know the security levels of values found using the path “//”. This is why dynamic
checking is necessary.
The reduction rules for update and run are based on the definition of the update
function , parametrised on p, lh, χ, V , which applied to a tree or to a node label
returns a data term and a set of substitutions. Table 8 defines the function . The
only interesting rule is (Up): it matches the selected (underlined) U in p(T ) with
χ obtaining a substitution s. Then it continues updating V s obtaining the data
term V ′ and the set of substitutions Θ. Finally it replaces U with V ′ and adds to
Θ the substitution s{lh/ 	, p/.}. This is useful when s = {P/x} for solving
the references to the enclosing location and to the current path. We convene that
occurrences of “	” and “.” inside scripts in P are unaffected by this substitution.
Similarly if s = {T/x} we convene that occurrences of “	” and “.” inside scripts
in T leaves are unaffected by this substitution, i.e. that {T/x}{lh/ 	, p/.} =
{T/x} for any T, x, lh, p.
Some special forms of the update command have been already defined in [9]:
cutp(χ).Q := updatep(χ, ∅).Q
copyp(χ).Q := updatep(χ, χ).Q
pastep〈T 〉.Q := updatep(x, x|T ).Q where x does not occur in T,Q.
We will freely use these shorthands in the examples.
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Ch(Tv) type of channels communicating values of type Tv
Loc(i) type of locations at security level i
Script(i) type of scripts at security level i
Path type of paths, not containing “.”
PathLocal type of paths, possibly containing “.”
Pointer(i) type of pointers, not containing local paths, at security level i
PointerLocal(i) type of pointers, possibly containing local paths, at security level i
DLTree type of data-less trees
Tree type of trees, not containing local paths
TreeLocal type of trees, possibly containing local paths
Proc(i) type of processes, not containing local paths, at security level i
ProcLocal(i) type of processes, possibly containing local paths, at security level i
Net type of networks
where i ∈ L and Tv ranges over value types defined by
Tv ::= Ch(Tv) | Loc(i) | Script(i) | Path⋆ | DLTree | Tree⋆
Table 9
Syntax of types
3 Type Assignment
The main goals of our type system are to control communication of values, access
to data and migration of processes between locations. We will formalise this in
Section 4.
We rely on a notion of security levels, and therefore we assume a fixed partial order
(L,≤) of security levels with a bottom⊥. As already said in Section 2 we use h, i, j
to range over elements of L.
The syntax of types is the content of Table 9. Clearly the types correspond to the
syntactic categories of the previous section. We use the suffix Local when we allow
local paths. This distinction is useful since a run or an update command containing
a local path as index cannot be executed, but it can appear inside a script.
We will use Path⋆ as short for Path or PathLocal and similarly for the other
types. When more than one ⋆ appears in a typing rule we always assume that all of
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them are replaced either by ǫ or by Local.
We define the security level of a value type (notation |Tv|) as follows:
• |Ch(Tv)| = |Tv|;
• |Loc(i)| = |Script(i)|= i;
• |Path⋆| = |DLTree| = |Tree⋆| = ⊥.
An environment Σ gives the association between:
• variables and value types
• variables and local process types
i.e. we define:
Σ := ∅ |Σ, x : Tv |Σ, x : ProcLocal(i).
We use the environment by means of a standard axiom:
(axiom)
Σ, x : σ ⊢ x : σ
where σ ranges over value types and local process types.
Typing rules for channels, locations and scripts are as expected (recall that Π
ranges over processes and variables):
(chan)
Σ ⊢ cTv : Ch(Tv)
(loc)
Σ ⊢ li : Loc(i)
Σ ⊢ Π : Proc⋆(i)
(script)
Σ ⊢ Π : Script(i)
Typing rules for paths are given in Table 10: a local path always gets the type
PathLocal instead of Path.
The typing rule for pointers
Σ ⊢ λ : Loc(i) Σ ⊢ p : Path⋆
(pointer)
Σ ⊢ p@λ : Pointer⋆(i)
gives a Pointer or a PointerLocal type according to the path type. The security
level of the pointer is the security level of the pointed location.
Typing rules for trees are given in Table 11. According to these typing rules:
• a tree is data-less, i.e. it has the type DLTree, only if all its leaves are labelled
by ∅;
• a tree that has at least one node labelled by a local pointer will be typed by
TreeLocal.
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(patha)
Σ ⊢ a : Path
(path//)
Σ ⊢ // : Path
(path..)
Σ ⊢ .. : Path
(path.)
Σ ⊢ . : PathLocal
Σ ⊢ p : Path⋆ Σ ⊢ p′ : Path⋆
(path/)
Σ ⊢ p / p′ : Path⋆
Σ ⊢ p : Path
(pathL)
Σ ⊢ p : PathLocal
Table 10
Typing of paths
(treeEmpty)
Σ ⊢ ∅ : DLTree
Σ ⊢ T : DLTree
(treeDLa)
Σ ⊢ a[T ] : DLTree
Σ ⊢ T : Tree⋆
(treea)
Σ ⊢ a[T ] : Tree⋆
Σ ⊢ T1 : DLTree Σ ⊢ T2 : DLTree
(treeDL|)
Σ ⊢ T1 | T2 : DLTree
Σ ⊢ Π : Script(i)
(treeScript)
Σ ⊢ a[Π] : Tree
Σ ⊢ T1 : Tree
⋆ Σ ⊢ T2 : Tree
⋆
(tree|)
Σ ⊢ T1 | T2 : Tree
⋆
Σ ⊢ p@λ : Pointer⋆(i)
(treePointer)
Σ ⊢ a[p@λ] : Tree⋆
Σ ⊢ T : DLTree
(treeDL)
Σ ⊢ T : Tree
Σ ⊢ T : Tree
(treeL)
Σ ⊢ T : TreeLocal
Table 11
Typing of trees
Typing rules for processes are given in Table 12. The rule (go) allows a process
whose source location is of security level i to migrate to a location at security level
j only if j ≤ i.
In the typing rules for update we assume that χ ∈ {xDL, x,y⋆@xj ,xj}, and we
define the environment Σχ for associating types to the variables bound by the pat-
tern.
Σχ =


x : DLTree if χ = xDL,
x : Tree if χ = x,
x : Loc(j), y : Path⋆ if χ = y⋆@xj ,
x : ProcLocal(j) if χ = xj
We define the security level of a pattern (notation |χ|) as expected:
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(proc0)
Σ ⊢ 0 : Proc⋆(i)
Σ ⊢ P1 : Proc
⋆(i) Σ ⊢ P2 : Proc
⋆(i)
(proc|)
Σ ⊢ P1 | P2 : Proc
⋆(i)
Σ ⊢ P : Proc⋆(i) |Tv| ≤ i
(procν)
Σ ⊢ (νcTv)P : Proc⋆(i)
Σ ⊢ v : Tv Σ ⊢ γ : Ch(Tv) |Tv| ≤ i
(out)
Σ ⊢ γ¯〈v〉 : Proc⋆(i)
Σ, x : Tv ⊢ P : Proc⋆(i) Σ ⊢ γ : Ch(Tv) |Tv| ≤ i
(input)
Σ ⊢ γ(x).P : Proc⋆(i)
Σ, x : Tv ⊢ P : Proc⋆(i) Σ ⊢ γ : Ch(Tv) |Tv| ≤ i
(!input)
Σ ⊢ !γ(x).P : Proc⋆(i)
Σ ⊢ P : Proc⋆(i) Σ ⊢ λ : Loc(j) j ≤ i
(go)
Σ ⊢ go λ.P : Proc⋆(i)
Σ ⊢ P : Proc⋆(i)
(goHome)
Σ ⊢ go 	 .P : ProcLocal(i)
Σ ⊢ p : Path⋆
(run)
Σ ⊢ runp : Proc
⋆(i)
Σ ⊢ p : Path⋆ Σ ∪ Σχ ⊢ P : Proc
⋆(i) |χ| ≤ i
(copy)
Σ ⊢ updatep(χ, χ).P : Proc
⋆(i)
Σ ⊢ p : Path⋆ Σ ∪ Σχ ⊢ P : Proc
⋆(i)
χ 6= x |χ| < i Σχ ⊢ V : TPS(j) j ≤ i
(paste)
Σ ⊢ updatep(χ, V ).P : Proc
⋆(i)
Σ, x : ProcLocal(i) ⊢ P : ProcLocal(i)
x : ProcLocal(i) ⊢ V : TPS(j) j ≤ i
(pasteHere)
Σ ⊢ update.(x
i, V ).P : ProcLocal(i)
Table 12
Typing of processes
• |xDL| =|x| = ⊥;
• |y⋆@xj | = |xj | = j.
In these rules TPS(j) stands for Tree or Pointer⋆(j) or Script(j).
The three typing rules for the updating command are necessary since we require:
• all processes to be allowed to copy all trees and to replace only data-less trees
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∅ ⊢ T : Tree ∅ ⊢ P : Proc(i)
(netIloc)
⊢ li[ T ‖ P ] : Net
∅ ⊢ T : Tree ∅ ⊢ P : Proc(j)
(netOloc)
⊢ li[ T ‖ P ] : Net
(net0)
⊢ 0 : Net
⊢ N : Net
(netν)
⊢ (νcTv)N : Net
⊢ N1 : Net ⊢ N2 : Net N (N1) ∩N (N2) = ∅
(net|)
⊢ N1 | N2 : Net
Table 13
Typing of networks
(rules (copy) and (paste));
• processes at the same security level of a leaf to be allowed to copy the leaf (rule
(copy));
• processes at a higher security level than a leaf to be allowed to replace the leaf
with a data term of a security level not greater than the security level of the
process itself (rule (paste));
• a process script in a leaf to be able to replace itself with a data term of a security
level not greater than its own security level (rule (pasteHere)).
As a consequence a process can replace a non data-less tree only if all the leaves
of this tree contain data terms of security levels lower than the security level of the
process itself. For this purpose the process needs first to replace all the leaves con-
taining pointers and scripts by the empty tree and then to replace the so obtained
data-less tree.
Typing rules for networks are given in Table 13. For typing a location in a network
we have two typing rules: the initial rule (netIloc) and the ongoing rule (netOloc).
The first rule requires the process to have the same security level of the enclosing
location, while the second one allows a process of any security level. This reflects
the requirement that access and mobility rights of processes depend on their source
locations, as we will discuss in Section 4.
The function N associates to a network the set of its location names:
N (0) = ∅ N (li[ T ‖ P ]) = {l} N (N1 | N2) = N (N1) ∪ N (N2).
It is used in rule (net|) to assure that each location name occurs at most once in a
typed network.
The system satisfies subject reduction:
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Theorem 3.1 (Subject reduction) Let ⊢ N : Net and N → N′, then ⊢ N′ : Net.
The proof is presented in Appendix B. It uses some Generation and Substitution
lemmas which are also presented in Appendix B.
4 Safety properties
In the present section, using the subject reduction, we can show some relevant prop-
erties of typed initial networks. We say that a network is initial when its locations
can be typed by means of the initial typing rules.
More meaningful than the subject reduction theorem are the following properties
of initial networks: 5
P0 a channel in a process whose source location has level h can communicate only
values whose security level is less than or equal to h;
P1 a process whose source location has level h can migrate to a location of level j
only if j ≤ h;
P2 a process whose source location has level h can copy from the local tree only
data of level j with j ≤ h;
P3 a process whose source location has level h can modify in the local tree only data
of level j with j < h, unless the process itself was generated by running a script
of security level h in a tree at path p, and in this case it can modify scripts which
are both of the security level h and reachable by the path p;
P4 a script of level j which is a leaf of a tree in a location of level i can be activated
only if j ≤ i.
In order to discuss these properties we need to formalise the notion of “source”
location of a process. Roughly by “source” location of a process we mean the loca-
tion where the process was in the initial net or where the process was created by a
run command.
We use _ to denote the reflexive and transitive closure of → and ~ν to denote a
possibly empty sequence of channel restrictions. If N is an initial network and
N _ ~ν(lh[ T || P |Q ] | N′), then the source location of the process P in this
reduction is defined by induction on the reduction _ and by cases:
• if N ≡ ~ν(lh[ T || P | Q ] | N′), then the source location of P is lh;
• if N _ ~ν(lh[ T || runp | Q′ ] | N′) → ~ν(lh[ T || P | Q ] | N′)
since p(T ) p,lh,xh,x T, {{R1/x}, . . . , {Rn/x}} and R1 ≡ P | R
and Q ≡ R | R2 | . . . | Rn | Q′, then the source location of P is lh;
5 Notice that P0, P1, P2, P3 and P4 are network invariants in the sense of [3].
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• if N _ ~ν(lh[ T ′ || updatep(χ, V ).P ′ | Q′ ] | N′) → ~ν(lh[ T || P | Q ] | N′)
since p(T ′) p,lh,χ,V T, {s1, . . . ,sn} and P ′s1 ≡ P | R andQ ≡ R | P ′s2 | . . .
|P ′sn | Q′, then the source location of P is the source one of updatep(χ, V ).P ′
in the reduction without the last step;
• if N _ ~ν(lh[ T || cTv〈v〉 | cTv(z).P ′ | Q′ ] | N′) → ~ν(lh[ T || P | Q ] | N′)
and P ′{v/z} ≡ P | R and Q ≡ R | Q′, then the source location of P is the
source location of cTv(z).P ′ in the reduction without the last step;
• if N _ ~ν(lh[ T ‖ cTv〈v〉 | !cTv(z).P ′ | Q′ ] | N′) → ~ν(lh[ T ‖ P | Q ] | N′)
and P ′{v/z} ≡ P | R and Q ≡ !cTv(z).P ′ | R | Q′, then the source location of
P is the source location of !cTv(z).P ′ in the reduction without the last step;
• if N _ ~ν(lh[ T || go lh.P ′ | Q′ ] | N′) → ~ν(lh[ T || P | Q ] | N′) and
P ′ ≡ P | R and Q ≡ R | Q′, then the source location of P is the source location
of go lh.P ′ in the reduction without the last step;
• if N _ ~ν(lh[T ‖ Q′ ] | mj [ T ′ ‖ go lh.P ′ | R ] | N′′)→ ~ν(lh[ T ‖ P | Q ] | N′)
and P ′ ≡ P | R′ and Q ≡ R′ | Q′ and N′ ≡ mj [ T ′ || R ] | N′′, then the
source location of P is the source location of go lh.P ′ in the reduction without
the last step;
• if N _ ~ν(lh[ T ′ || P | Q′ ] | N′′) → ~ν(lh[ T || P | Q ] | N′), then the
source location of P is the source location of P in the reduction without the last
step.
The first two cases are the basic cases, in which the process P takes the current
location as source location: in the first one the network is initial, in the second
one the process P is generated by the last reduction step. In the last case the re-
duction does not modify the process P , which preserves its source location. In all
other cases an action prefixing the process P (possibly in parallel with other pro-
cesses and/or modulo the substitution of a value for a variable) is consumed and the
source location of P is the source location of the process starting with that action
in the reduction without the last step.
We can then formalise the above properties as follows.
Proposition 4.1 If N is an initial network, and N _ ~ν(li[ T || P | Q ] | N′), and
h is the security level of the source location of P , then:
P0 P ≡ c¯Tv〈v〉 implies |Tv| ≤ h;
P1 P ≡ go mj .P ′ implies j ≤ h;
P2 P ≡ updatep(χ, χ).P ′ implies |χ| ≤ h;
P3 P ≡ updatep(χ, V ).P ′ implies either |χ| < h or χ = xh and P has been
generated by activating a script in a tree at path p;
P4 P ≡ runp implies that the execution of P can only activate scripts at security
level i.
Property P4 is an immediate consequence of the reduction rule (run). The remain-
ing properties follow easily observing that each process has the security level of its
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source location: see Appendix C for the proof.
Proposition 4.2 If N is an initial network, and N _ ~ν(li[ T || P | Q ] | N′), and
h is the security level of the source location of P , then ⊢ P : Proc(h).
5 Examples
To simplify the following examples we will consider natural numbers with their
order as security levels.
5.1 Insensitivity to higher level values
The security policy enforced by our typing system should not be confused with non-
interference. A high level process can easily declassify information of its security
level to lower levels. However in the absence of high level processes, lower level
processes are insensitive even to the existence of higher level data.
Consider the following networks
N1 = l
h[ T || P ]
and
N2 = l
h[ T || P ] | mj [ T ′ || 0 ]
where h < j.
Then the following property holds
Proposition 5.1 For each N such that N1 _ N we have N2 _ N | mj[ T ′ || 0 ].
Conversely if N2 _ N′, then N′ = N | mj[ T ′ || 0 ] and N1 _ N.
Proof The only transition that could violate the theorem would involve a go mj
action. This action cannot occur in P by property P1 of Proposition 4.1. Moreover
by property P4 of Proposition 4.1 no script contained in T with occurrences of
go mj could be activated.
Another similar result is the following. Let N be a network all whose locations
have security level less than or equal to h. Let V be a value of security level j > h.
Then
Proposition 5.2 Under the above condition we have N _ N′ if and only if N[∅/V ]
_ N
′[∅/V ], where N[∅/V ] is the network obtained by replacing in N some occur-
rences of V in the leaves with the empty tree.
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Proof No pattern of security level j can be contained in a process of level at most h
by properties P2 and P3 of Proposition 4.1, nor in a script activated inside a location
of level at most h by property P4 of Proposition 4.1.
5.2 Remote Voting System
The next example models a remote voting for election of a leader from a given
list of candidates, inspired by [13]. In this example, we allow tree nodes to contain
integers, in order to represent the counters of votes. A pattern too can be a variable
of type Integer and of a fixed security level.
The network consists of an authority location, a cabin location and a fixed number
of voter locations. The authority location has level 3, while the cabin and all the
voter locations have level 1.
The cabin location
cabin1[voterList[ . . . | voterId[ P ]| . . .] | candList[ T ] || 0 ],
where P = (νcPath)(cut.(x1).go voter1 .¯bCh(Path)〈cPath〉 | d¯Ch(Path)〈cPath〉) and
T = . . . | name[ 02 ] | . . . ,
contains as data the voter list and the candidate list with counters of votes.
The voter list has for each voter an edge labelled by the voter identifier pointing
to the scripted process P of security level 1. This script contains two processes.
One process first destroys itself and then goes to the voter location, where it com-
municates a secret channel which the voter will use to express his vote. The other
process simply communicates the same secret channel via the channel d.
The candidate list has for each candidate an edge labelled by the candidate name
pointing to an integer (the vote counter, initially 0) of security level 2. This assures
that the voter can copy the subtree with candidate list and see candidate names,
but by property P2 of Proposition 4.1 he cannot see and use already memorised
votes to make his decision.
A voter location contains two processes: the first process goes to the cabin and
activates the process P and the second one waits to receive a channel along which
he will communicate his vote, after going to the cabin and making a choice (based
on the candidate list):
voter1[ . . . || go cabin1.runvoterList/voterId |
bCh(Path)(y).go cabin1.Choice(z).y¯〈z〉 | . . .].
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The process in the authority location starts the elections by going to the cabin where
he repeatedly collects one private channel via the channel d, receives along this
private channel one candidate name and increases by 1 the corresponding candidate
counter:
authority3[ Start[Q] | . . . || runStart | . . . ],
Q = go cabin1.!d(v).v(w).updatecandVoteList/w(t
2, t+ 1).
Similarly the authority can end the election going to the cabin and erasing the voter
list.
Notice that a malicious voter cannot vote more than once, since the process P de-
stroys itself, and if he would send the identifier of another voter, the other voter
would receive the secret channel to vote. Moreover by property P3 of Proposi-
tion 4.1 a malicious voter cannot change the vote counters in the cabin location,
since the vote counters have security level 2, while the voters have security level 1.
A malicious voter can send to the location of another voter a process which votes
in place of the voter itself. We do not know how to avoid this kind of attacks, which
model a voter stealing the position of another voter during the voting act.
The present encoding is simpler than the encoding of the same example given in [8].
5.3 Distributed Library
Let us consider a network consisting of a distributed library (main library and
libraries of specific fields), readers, staff members and a head. The main library
(Library) has data subtrees for management and catalogue. The library catalogue
contains in its leaves pointers to full books which are distributed in leaves of spe-
cific field libraries.
Library1 [Management [ WorkingHours[HourP lan2] | . . . ] |
Catalog [ . . . | Pierce[Types[Pierce/Types@LICS1] |
Category[Pierce/Category@LICS1] . . .] |
| Cohn[Universal[Cohn/Universal@ALGEBRA1] | . . .]
|| . . .],
LICS1[ . . . | Pierce [ Types [ Book.pdf1 ] | Category [ Book.pdf1] | . . . ] || . . . ],
ALGEBRA1 [ . . . | . . . Cohn [ Universal [ Book.pdf1 ] | . . . ] || . . . ].
For example, the reader
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Reader1[Book[Pierce[∅] | . . . ] || go Library1.copyCatalog/Pierce/Types(y@x
1).
go x.copyPierce/Types(z
1).go Reader1.pasteBook/Pierce(Types[z]) ]
goes to the library, reads in the catalogue the location of the book, goes to the
sublibrary, copies the book and pastes the copy in the tree of his location.
The typing system introduced in the current paper assures that the reader can copy
content of any book, but he cannot modify it (property P3 of Proposition 4.1).
Besides, he cannot see HourP lan in the management leaf, because he is of less
security level than the HourP lan (property P2 of Proposition 4.1).
The staff is given security level 2, such that they can update catalogue, modify the
book contents, but only copy the HourP lan.
The head, being of security level 3, is the only one that can update all the data at
the Library. He can, for example, change working hours.
6 Conclusion
We discussed a typed version of the Xdπ calculus in which the access to resources
and the mobility of processes must respect a security policy. Since we used a typed
pattern matching which includes a dynamic type checking we will investigate both
type checking and type inference for this calculus, taking into account [7].
We plan to study modifications of our type system which allow to prevent illegal
flow of information [18], also in presence of dynamic flow policies [22].
We want to study the impact of our typing system in proving equivalence of net-
works, using different notions of behavioural equivalence. We plan to start from
the untyped equivalencies defined in [14] and [9], and to refine them using types as
done for example in [17] and [12].
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A Structural Congruence
The structural congruence for the Xdπ calculus is the least equivalence relation on
networks that satisfies alpha-conversion, the commutative monoid properties for
(∅, | ) on trees, for (0, | ) on processes and for (0, | ) on networks, and the axioms
of Table A.1. As usual fn is the set of free channel names occurring in a process or
in a tree or in a network.
(trees) V ≡ V ′ ⇒ a[V ] ≡ a[V ′]
(scripts) P ≡ P ′ ⇒ P ≡ P ′
(processes) (νcTv)0 ≡ 0
v ≡ v′ ⇒ c¯Tv〈v〉 ≡ c¯Tv〈v′〉
(νcTv)(νdTv
′
)P ≡ (νdTv
′
)(νcTv)P
cTv 6∈ fn(P )⇒ P | (νcTv)Q ≡ (νcTv)(P | Q)
V ≡ V ′ ∧ P ≡ P ′ ⇒ updatep(χ, V ).P ≡ updatep(χ, V
′).P ′
(networks) (νcTv)0 ≡ 0
(νcTv)(νdTv
′
)N ≡ (νdTv
′
)(νcTv)N
cTv 6∈ fn(N)⇒ N | (νcTv)N′ ≡ (νcTv)(N | N′)
T ≡ T ′ ∧ P ≡ P ′ ⇒ lh[ T ‖ P ] ≡ lh[ T ′ ‖ P ′ ]
cTv 6∈ fn(T )⇒ lh[ T ‖ (νcTv)P ] ≡ (νcTv)lh[ T ‖ P ]
Table A.1
Structural congruence
B Subject Reduction
We prove that the typing of networks is preserved by structural congruence and by
reduction. These proofs use generation lemmas which allow to reverse the typing
rules. Notice that for networks we need to distinguish initial and ongoing typing
rules.
We use τ to range over all types of Table 9.
Lemma B.1 (Generation lemma for variables, channels, locations and paths)
(1) Σ ⊢ x : τ ⇒ x : τ ∈ Σ.
(2) Σ ⊢ cTv : τ ⇒ τ = Ch(Tv).
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(3) Σ ⊢ li : τ ⇒ τ = Loc(i).
(4) Σ ⊢ p : τ and p is a local path ⇒ τ = PathLocal.
(5) Σ ⊢ p : τ and p is not a local path ⇒ τ = Path⋆.
Lemma B.2 (Generation lemma for scripts, pointers and trees)
(1) Σ ⊢ Π : τ ⇒ τ = Script(i) and Σ ⊢ Π : Proc⋆(i).
(2) Σ ⊢ p@λ : τ ⇒ τ = Pointer⋆(i) and Σ ⊢ λ : Loc(i) and Σ ⊢ p : Path⋆.
(3) Σ ⊢ ∅ : τ ⇒ either τ = DLTree or τ = Tree⋆.
(4) Σ ⊢ T1 | T2 : τ ⇒ either τ = DLTree and Σ ⊢ T1 : DLTree and
Σ ⊢ T2 : DLTree or τ = Tree⋆ and Σ ⊢ T1 : Tree⋆ and Σ ⊢ T2 : Tree⋆.
(5) Σ ⊢ a[T ] : τ ⇒ either τ = DLTree and Σ ⊢ T : DLTree or τ = Tree⋆
and Σ ⊢ T : Tree⋆.
(6) Σ ⊢ a[p@λ] : τ ⇒ τ = Tree⋆ and Σ ⊢ p@λ : Pointer⋆(i).
(7) Σ ⊢ a[Π] : τ ⇒ τ = Tree⋆ and Σ ⊢ Π : Script(i).
Lemma B.3 (Generation lemma for processes)
(1) Σ ⊢ 0 : τ ⇒ τ = Proc⋆(i).
(2) Σ ⊢ P1 | P2 : τ ⇒ τ = Proc⋆(i) and Σ ⊢ P1 : Proc⋆(i) and Σ ⊢ P2 :
Proc⋆(i).
(3) Σ ⊢ (νcTv)P : τ ⇒ τ = Proc⋆(i) and Σ ⊢ P : Proc⋆(i) and |Tv| ≤ i.
(4) Σ ⊢ γ¯〈v〉 : τ ⇒ τ = Proc⋆(i) and Σ ⊢ v : Tv and Σ ⊢ γ : ch(Tv) and
|Tv| ≤ i.
(5) Σ ⊢ γ(x).P : τ ⇒ τ = Proc⋆(i) and Σ, x : Tv ⊢ P : Proc⋆(i) and
Σ ⊢ γ : ch(Tv) and |Tv| ≤ i.
(6) Σ ⊢ !γ(x).P : τ ⇒ τ = Proc⋆(i) and Σ, x : Tv ⊢ P : Proc⋆(i) and
Σ ⊢ γ : ch(Tv) and |Tv| ≤ i.
(7) Σ ⊢ goλ.P : τ ⇒ τ = Proc⋆(i) and ⊢ λ : Loc(j) and j ≤ i and
Σ ⊢ P : Proc⋆(i).
(8) Σ ⊢ go 	 .P : τ ⇒ τ = ProcLocal(i) and Σ ⊢ P : Proc⋆(i).
(9) Σ ⊢ runp : τ ⇒ τ = Proc⋆(i) and Σ ⊢ p : Path⋆.
(10) Σ ⊢ updatep(χ, χ).P : τ ⇒ τ = Proc⋆(i) and Σ ⊢ p : Path⋆ and
Σ ∪ Σχ ⊢ P : Proc
⋆(i) and |χ| ≤ i.
(11) Σ ⊢ updatep(χ, V ).P : τ and χ 6= V, x and (p 6= . or χ 6= xj for all j)
⇒ τ = Proc⋆(i) and Σ ⊢ p : Path⋆ and Σ ∪ Σχ ⊢ P : Proc⋆(i) and
|χ| < i and Σχ ⊢ V : TPS(j) and j ≤ i.
(12) Σ ⊢ update.(xi, V ).P : τ ⇒ τ = ProcLocal(i) andΣ, x : ProcLocal(i) ⊢ P :
ProcLocal(i) and x : ProcLocal(i) ⊢ V : TPS(j) and j ≤ i.
Lemma B.4 (Generation lemma for networks) (1) ⊢ 0 : τ ⇒ τ = Net.
(2) ⊢ N1 | N2 : τ ⇒ τ = Net and ⊢ N1 : Net and ⊢ N2 : Net and N (N1) ∩
N (N2) = ∅.
(3) ⊢ li[ T ‖ P ] : τ ⇒ τ = Net and ∅ ⊢ T : Tree and
• either (initial) ∅ ⊢ P : Proc(i),
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• or (ongoing) ∅ ⊢ P : Proc(j).
(4) ⊢ (νcTv)N : τ ⇒ τ = Net and ⊢ N : Net.
The following two propositions point out some properties of our type system and
can be easily verified by induction of deductions.
By replacing in an arbitrary process “	” by a location name (whose security level
agrees with that of the process) and “.” by a path not containing “.” we get a process
typeable with a process type.
Proposition B.5 If Σ ⊢ P : Proc⋆(i) and Σ ⊢ p : Path and j ≤ i, then Σ ⊢
P{lj/ 	, p/.} : Proc(i).
A process which has a given security level has also all bigger security levels. The
proof follows easily observing that the nil process can be typed with an arbitrary
security level and that all typing rules only check that the security level of the
current process is bigger than other security levels.
Proposition B.6 Σ ⊢ P : Proc⋆(i) and i ≤ j imply Σ ⊢ P : Proc⋆(j).
As usual the “core” of the subject reduction proofs are substitution lemmas.
Lemma B.7 (Substitution lemma for trees, pointers, scripts and processes)
(1) If Σ, x : Tv ⊢ V : TPS(i) and Σ ⊢ v : Tv, then Σ ⊢ V {v/x} : TPS(i).
(2) If Σ, x : ProcLocal(j) ⊢ V : TPS(i) and Σ ⊢ P : ProcLocal(j), then
Σ ⊢ V {P/x} : TPS(i).
(3) If Σ, x : Tv ⊢ P : Proc⋆(i) and Σ ⊢ v : Tv, then Σ ⊢ P{v/x} : Proc⋆(i).
(4) If Σ, x : ProcLocal(j) ⊢ P : Proc⋆(i) and Σ ⊢ Q : ProcLocal(j), then
Σ ⊢ P{Q/x} : Proc⋆(i).
(5) If Σ ⊢ updatep(χ, V ).P : Proc(i) and Σ ⊢ T : Tree and T  p,li,χ,V
T ′,Θ, then Σ ⊢ T ′ : Tree.
Proof The proofs of the first four points are standard by induction on V and P ,
respectively.
For (5) we need to consider three cases according to the shape of χ. We give the
proof for χ = y⋆@xj , the remaining cases being similar. Let Θ = {s1, . . . , sn}
and 1 ≤ k ≤ n. By construction sk = {mj/x, p′k/y}, for some mj and p′k such
that ⊢ p′k : Path⋆. By Lemma B.3(10) or (11) Σ, x : Loc(j), y : Path⋆ ⊢ V :
TPS(h) with h ≤ i. By Point (1) Σ ⊢ V sk : TPS(h). By construction T ′
is obtained from T by replacing top-down the nodes mj@p′k by V sk, so we can
easily check that Σ ⊢ T ′ : Tree using the typing rules for trees.
Theorem 3.1 (Subject reduction) Let ⊢ N : Net and N → N′, then ⊢ N′ : Net.
Proof We only consider some interesting cases.
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Case N ≡ lh[ T1 || go mj .P | Q ] | mj [ T2 || R ] and the reduction is by rule (go):
lh[ T1 || go m
j .P | Q ] | mj[ T2 || R ]→ l
h[ T1 || Q ] | m
j[ T2 || P | R ].
From ⊢ N : Net, by Lemma B.4(2) it follows that ⊢ N1 ≡ lh[ T1 || go mj .P | Q ] :
Net and ⊢ N2 ≡ mj [ T2 || R ] : Net. From N1 : Net, by Lemma B.4(3) we get
∅ ⊢ T1 : Tree and
• either (initial) ∅ ⊢ go mj .P | Q : Proc(h);
• or (ongoing) ∅ ⊢ go mj .P | Q : Proc(i).
We consider the ongoing case, the proof for the initial case being the same. In
this case by Lemma B.3(2) we have that ∅ ⊢ go mj .P : Proc(i) and then by
Lemma B.3(7) ∅ ⊢ P : Proc(i). We conclude by applying the ongoing typing
rules taking into account Proposition B.6.
Case N ≡ lh[ T || runp | Q] and the reduction is by rule (run):
lh[ T || runp | Q]→ l
h[ T || P1 | . . . | Pn | Q]
where p(T )  p,lh,xh,x T, {{P1/x}, . . . , {Pn/x}}. From ⊢ N : Net, by
Lemma B.4(3) ∅ ⊢ T : Tree. By construction Pk = P ′k{lh/ 	, p/.}, where P ′k
matches xh and therefore ∅ ⊢ P ′k : ProcLocal(h) and then ∅ ⊢ Pk : Proc(h)
by Proposition B.5. We conclude by applying the ongoing typing rules taking into
account Proposition B.6.
Case N ≡ lh[ T || updatep(χ, V ).P | Q] and the reduction is by rule (update):
lh[ T || updatep(χ, V ).P | Q]→ l
h[ T ′ || Ps1 | . . . | Psn | Q]
where p(T )  p,lh,χ,V T ′, {s1, . . . ,sn}. From ⊢ N : Net, by Lemma B.4(3)
∅ ⊢ T : Tree and
• either (initial) ∅ ⊢ updatep(χ, V ).P | Q : Proc(h),
• or (ongoing) ∅ ⊢ updatep(χ, V ).P | Q : Proc(i).
We consider the ongoing case with χ = y⋆@xj , the proof for the other cases being
similar. In this case by Lemma B.7(5) ∅ ⊢ T ′ : Tree. By Lemma B.3(2) we
have that ∅ ⊢ updatep(χ, V ).P : Proc(i) and then by Lemma B.3(10) or (11)
x : Loc(j), y : Path⋆ ⊢ P : Proc(i). By construction sk = {mj/x, p′k/y}, for
some mj and p′k such that ⊢ p′k : Path⋆. By Lemma B.7(3) this gives ∅ ⊢ Psk :
Proc(i). We conclude by applying the ongoing typing rules for processes.
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C Safety proof
Proposition 4.2 If N is an initial network, and N _ ~ν(li[ T || P | Q ] | N′), and
h is the security level of the source location of P , then ⊢ P : Proc(h).
Proof The proof is by induction on _ and by cases on the definition of source
location using Generation and Substitution Lemmas.
Case N ≡ ~ν(li[ T || P | Q ] | N′). In this case i = h and ⊢ N : Net using the
initial typing rules. By Lemma B.4(4), (2), (3) ⊢ P | Q : Proc(h) which implies
⊢ P : Proc(h) by Lemma B.3(2).
Case N _ ~ν(lh[ T || runp | Q′ ] | N′) → ~ν(lh[ T || P | Q ] | N′) since
p(T )  p,lh,xh,x T, {{R1/x}, . . . , {Rn/x}} and R1 ≡ P | R and Q ≡
R | R2 | . . . | Rn | Q′. Then p(T ) p,lh,xh,x T, {{R1/x}, . . . , {Rn/x}}
implies match(R′1,xh) = {R1/x} and R1 ≡ R′1{lh/ 	, p1/.} for some
R′1, p1 such that ⊢ R′1 : ProcLocal(h) and p1 is a path without occurrences of
“.”. Then ⊢ p1 : Path which together with ⊢ R′1 : ProcLocal(h) imply ⊢ R1 :
Proc(h) by Proposition B.5. So we conclude ⊢ P : Proc(h) by Lemma B.3(2).
Case N _ ~ν(li[ T ′ || updatep(y⋆@xj , V ).P ′ | Q′ ] | N′)→ ~ν(li[ T || P | Q ] | N′)
since p(T ′) p,li,y⋆@xj ,V T, {s1, . . . ,sn} and P ′s1 ≡ P | R andQ ≡ R | P ′s2 | . . .
|P ′sn | Q′. By induction we have that ∅ ⊢ updatep(χ, V ).P : Proc(h) and then
by Lemma B.3(10) or (11) x : Loc(j), y : Path⋆ ⊢ P : Proc(h). By construction
sk = {mj/x, p′k/y}, for some mj , p′k such that ⊢ p′k : Path⋆. By Lemma B.7(1)
this gives ∅ ⊢ Psk : Proc(h).
The proofs for the remaining cases are similar to the proof of the last case.
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